





Indeterminate preferences have long been a tricky subject for choice theory.
One reason for which preferences may be less than fully determinate is the lack
of conﬁdence in one’s preferences. In this paper, a representation of conﬁdence in
preferences is proposed. It is used to develop an account of the role which conﬁ-
dence which rests on the following intuition: the more important the decision to be
taken, the more conﬁdence is required in the preferences needed to take it. An ax-
iomatisation of this choice rule is proposed. This theory provides a natural account
of when an agent should defer a decision; namely, when the importance of the de-
cision exceeds his conﬁdence in the relevant preferences. Possible applications of
the notion of conﬁdence in preferences to social choice are brieﬂy explored.
Keywords: Incomplete preference; Revealed preference; Conﬁdence in preferences;
Deferral of decisions; Importance of decisions; Social choice
JEL classiﬁcation: D01, D71.
Under the standard economic model, a rational agent’s preferences can be repre-
sented by a complete order on the alternatives; but this has been famously and repeat-
edly challenged. Preferences may be fuzzy, imprecise or vague (Aumann, 1962; Salles,
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1998). Preferences may be incomplete because the agent has not yet settled on the pref-
erences which he deems appropriate, perhaps due to unresolved conﬂict (Levi, 1986).
Or still, preferences may be incomplete because the agent does not see that some op-
tions will ever be comparable: after all, there is no reason to always expect them to be
(Sen, 1997). From both a descriptive or a normative point of view, the assumption of
completeness or determinacy of preferences is highly questionable.
We consider here the case of choice under certainty; the agent will be assumed to
know consequences of choosing each of the alternatives, and there will be no question
of beliefs or probabilities over the relevant “states”. The only relevant attitude is the
agent’s preferences (which, as standard, are taken to be subjective). If an agent settles
on a preference for one alternative over another (or decides on determinate indifference
between the alternatives), we will sometimes say that he has emitted a value judgement:
a judgement about the relative value of the alternatives for him. In situations of choice
under certainty, the agent’s choices are standardly taken to be guided entirely by his
preferences, or, toputthesamepointinotherterms, byhisvaluejudgements. Inversely,
his preferences are traditionally taken to be derivable from his choices.
Many of the challenges to the standard model evoked above relate to the fact that
agents do not always endorse clear, categorical value judgements on every pair of alter-
natives. One intuitive reason for this, which has been hardly emphasised though tacitly
evoked at times in the literature, is that people often have differing degrees of conﬁ-
dence in their value judgements. Sometimes, they are not sure which of the alternatives
is best (by their own lights). Consider moral dilemmas: an agent might be conﬁdent
that it is better to sacriﬁce the life of one to save the lives of a hundred than not to;
although he thinks that it is better to sacriﬁce the life of one to save the lives of ﬁve
others than not to, he may be less conﬁdent in this value judgement; ﬁnally, he may be
totally unsure about whether it is better to sacriﬁce the life of a gifted musician for that
of a talented economist or not. The goal of this paper is to get a grip on the intuitive
notion of conﬁdence in one’s preferences.
To achieve this goal, we ﬁrst propose a representation of conﬁdence in preferences
(Section 1.1 and an account of its role in choice (Section 1.2). Although they may
turn out to be descriptively valid, the focus is normative: admitting that it is rational
to have different levels of conﬁdence in one’s preferences, the goal is say something
about what sorts of conﬁdence one can allow oneself to have and on the role conﬁdence
should play in choice. In Section 2, an axiomatisation of the notion of choice on the
basis of conﬁdence in preferences will be given. Under the proposal, conﬁdence will
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be related to two aspects of choice situations, which though apparently relevant in
many cases, have received little attention in the choice-theoretic literature to date: the
importance of a decision to be taken, and the question of when and whether to defer
the decision. In Section 3, we will discuss these two issues in detail. In Section 4, we
turn to the possible application of the notion of conﬁdence in social choice, attempting
a preliminary investigation into the question, and proposing a social choice rule which
takes into account the voters’ conﬁdence in their preferences. Proofs are relegated to
the Appendix.
1 Preference, conﬁdence and choice
1.1 Representing conﬁdence in preferences
Let X be a ﬁnite set of alternatives, with at least three members. Henceforth, we use
the generic terms x, y and so on to refer to elements of X, the generic terms S, T and so
on to refer to subsets of X. A weak ordering on a set is a complete, reﬂexive, transitive
relation on that set. The standard model represents preferences by weak orderings on
the set of alternatives X. Let P be the set of weak orderings on X; we use the generic
terms R, Ri, and so on to refer to elements of P and the generic term R to refer to
subsets of P. The generated strict ordering and indifference relation are deﬁned as
standard.
Weak orderings represent determinate preferences: for each pair of alternatives,
either the agent strictly prefers one to the other or is determinately indifferent. The
most common way of representing the preferences of someone who has not made up
his mind about whether one alternative is preferred to another or judges them to be
incomparable is by weakening the completeness assumption (Sen, 1970, 1997). Re-
ﬂexive, transitive relations which do not necessarily satisfy completeness are called
quasi-orderings. If Q is a quasi-ordering, then there are alternatives x and y such that
neither xQy nor yQx; these are cases where the agent does not have any determinate
preference – including determinate indifference – between the alternatives x and y.
In other words, he does not endorse any value judgement concerning the comparison
between x and y.
This is however not the only way to represent an agent who does not have deter-
minate preferences over all pairs of alternatives. Another possibility is to use sets of
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weak orderings.1 For a set of weak orderings R, there may be alternatives z and w
such that zRw for all R 2 R; in this case, the agent has a determinate weak preference
for z over w. By contrast, there may be alternatives x and y such that neither xRy for
all R 2 R nor yRx for all R 2 R. This represents an agent who does not have any
determinate preference over x and y; he endorses no value judgement concerning the
comparison between these alternatives.
The representation by sets of weak orderings is strictly more expressive than the
representation by a quasi-ordering in the following sense: to each set of weak order-
ings is associated a unique quasi-ordering which represents the same preferences, but
to each quasi-ordering one may associate more than one corresponding set of weak
orderings. As regards the ﬁrst point, given a set of weak orderings R, deﬁne the quasi-
ordering Q as follows: for all alternatives x, y, xQy if and only if xRy for all R 2 R.
It is straightforward to see that Q is a quasi-ordering and that Q and R represent the
same preferences: the agent has weak preference, strict preference, indifference or in-
determinacy according to one if and only if he does according to the other. By contrast,
Figure 1 shows two different sets of weak orderings, both of which correspond to the
empty quasi-ordering (for all x, y, neither xQy nor yQx); this illustrates the fact that
there may be no unique set corresponding to a given quasi-ordering. One can regain
uniqueness by adding a constraint on the set of orderings. We say that a set of weak
orderings R is tight if, for any weak ordering R, R 2 R if, for all alternatives x and y,
xRy if xR0y for all R0 2 R. This condition basically says that, if an ordering R agrees
with what all orderings in R have in common, then R is in R. It is straightforward
to check that to each quasi-ordering Q one can associate a unique tight set of weak
orderings; namely, the set containing all weak orderings R such that xRy if xQy, for
all alternatives x and y.2
Both of these representations can be interpreted as representations of the agent’s
conﬁdence in his preferences: he is conﬁdent in his preference for x over y if xQy or if
xRy for all R 2 R; he has no preference concerning x and y in which he is conﬁdent
if neither xQy nor yQx, or it is not the case that xRy for some R 2 R and it is not
1This method is related to that proposed in Levi (1986).
2The “expressivity” of the notion of quasi-ordering is more appropriate for choice theory, since the in-
formation given by a choice function (under the appropriate axiomatisation) is only sufﬁcient to pick out
a unique quasi-ordering. To pick out a unique set of weak orderings, more “Boolean” information about
preferences is required (for example: a is preferred to b if a is preferred to c). To stay closer to the traditional
framework of choice theory, throughout this paper we work with the expressiveness corresponding to quasi-
ordering; correspondingly, everything done with sets of weak orderings will be unique only up to tightness
of the sets.
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the case that yRx for other R 2 R. As a representation of the agent’s conﬁdence in
his preferences, these proposals have an evident defect: they are binary. Either the
agent is completely conﬁdent in a value judgement concerning two alternatives, or he
is completely unsure about any value judgement concerning the two alternatives in
question.
In reality, it seems that one can, rationally, have different degrees of conﬁdence in
one’s preferences or value judgements. Take the example of moral dilemmas. An agent
may be pretty conﬁdent that it is better to sacriﬁce the life of one to save the lives of
a thousand than to let the thousand perish. He also thinks that it is better to sacriﬁce
the life of one to save the lives of a ten than not to; but he is less conﬁdent in the latter
value judgement. And he is more conﬁdent in that judgement than in the following
judgement which he still, perhaps cautiously, endorses: that it is better to sacriﬁce the
life of one “ordinary” person for the lives of ten petty criminals than not to. There thus
appear to be degrees of conﬁdence in one’s value judgements or preferences; a model
of conﬁdence in preferences should be able to account for this.
One way to do this would be to introduce fuzzy preference relations, which do
admit “degrees” of the preference. These are generally interpreted as representing the
imprecision or ambiguity of the preference relation (Salles, 1998), and it is unclear
what the relationship between imprecision and conﬁdence is (see for example Keefe
and Smith (1996)). We shall explore another way, which explicitly builds on the second
representation presented above: instead of representing preferences by a set of weak
orderings, we use a nested family of weak orderings.3
Let  be a nested family of subsets of P.  represents conﬁdence in preferences
in the following way. If there is a set of weak orderings R 2  such that xRy for all
R 2 R, then the agent (weakly) prefers x to y. But he may not be very conﬁdent in
3That is, a set of sets of weak orderings such that, for each pair of distinct sets, one is strictly contained
in the other.
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this value judgement: his conﬁdence in the judgement is captured by the size of the
biggest set R0 in  such that xRy for all R 2 R0. So he is at least as conﬁdent that
z is better than w (by his lights) than that x is better than y if for every set of weak
orderings R 2  such that xRy for all R 2 R, zRw for all R 2 R; and he is more
conﬁdent in the former value judgement if there is a set R0 2  such that zRw for all
R 2 R0 but there are some R0 2 R0 such that it is not the case that xR0y.
Figure 2 illustrates the idea diagrammatically. The plane is the set of weak order-
ings: the points are weak orderings, so for each point and for every pair of alternatives,
the alternatives are ordered one way or another according to the weak ordering corre-
sponding to that point. The (ﬁlled) circles represent the sets in the nested family of sets
representing conﬁdence in preference; the fact that a value judgement holds in a circle
means that it holds for all points (weak orderings) in that circle. Finally, the fact that a
value judgement holds in a bigger circle than another represents the fact that conﬁdence
in the former is higher than conﬁdence in the latter.
It is evident from the diagram that to any nested family of sets of weak orderings
in P there corresponds a unique weak ordering on the set P of weak orderings on X.
For weak orderings R and R0 on X, R is lower than R0 according to the weak ordering
on P if the smallest set in the nested family containing R0 contains the smallest set in
6Brian Hill Conﬁdence in preferences
the nested family containing R0.4 Intuitively, the order represents how implausible the
weak orderings are as candidates for the “right” notion of preference (by the agent’s
lights): the higher a weak ordering is on the order, the “farther out” it is on the diagram
inFigure2, andthelesstheagenthefeelsthathehastoconsideritasa“right”reﬂection
of his preferences. Implausibility is a sort of dual notion to conﬁdence: the agent is
more conﬁdent in a value judgement if it holds for all weak orderings up to a higher
level of implausibility, and conversely, a highly implausible weak ordering will only be
taken into account if the agent demands a high level of conﬁdence. This leads to the
following representation of conﬁdence in preferences.
Deﬁnition 1.1. An implausibility order 6 is a weak ordering on P. 6 = ffR0j R0 6
RgjR 2 Pg is the nested family of subsets of P associated with 6.
The implausibility order 6 is said to be centred if there exists a single element R
with R 6 R0 for all R0 2 P. This element is called the centre.
Henceforth, we use I to denote the set of implausibility orders on P.
The rest of this paper will develop theories of choice based on this representation of
conﬁdence in preferences. Note that the representation does impose some non-trivial
conditions on the concept. In particular, it implies that for a given level of conﬁdence,
the preferences in which the agent is at least that conﬁdent are transitive and reﬂexive
(this follows from the points made above). This is a reasonable: if one is conﬁdent to a
certain degree than x is better than y, and one is conﬁdent to that degree that y is better
than z, then one is conﬁdence to at least that degree that x is better than z.
Centred implausibility orders have a single weak ordering as the least implausible
ordering on the set of alternatives. (Equivalently, the nested family of sets contains a
singleton set.) This represents the agent as having a “best guess” as to which value
judgement is “right” for any pair of alternatives, though he may be very unconﬁdent in
this judgement in many cases (as represented by the rest of the implausibility order).
We do not wish to take any speciﬁc position on whether this is a reasonable normative
constraintonrationalagents, oronwhetheritisdescriptivelyreasonable. Thecentering
property of implausibility orderings will generally not be a requirement for most of the
results presented here.
4Formally: for  a nested family of subsets of P, deﬁne 6 as follows: for any R;R0 2 P, R 6 R0 if,
for all R 2 , if R0 2 R then R 2 R. And for any weak order 6 on P, deﬁne the nested family of subsets
 to be that family containing all and only fR0j R0 6 Rg for all R 2 R. It is straightforward to see that
this is a bijection from nested families of subsets of P to weak orderings on P.
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Finally, by analogy with the property of tightness of sets of weak orderings we say
that an implausibility order 6 is tight if all the sets in 6 are tight.5
1.2 Conﬁdence and choice
A representation of the agent’s conﬁdence in his preferences is of little use on its own;
an account of the role of conﬁdence in choice is also required. In this section, we
outline the principal ideas and notions involved in this account; in Section 2, we ax-
iomatise the notion of rationalisability proposed here, and in Section 3 we discuss in
more detail some of the central notions.
The basic intuition is simple: the more important the decision to be taken, the more
conﬁdent one should be in the value judgements required to take that decision. If a
choice between x and y is to be made, but the choice is not particularly important, one
can chose x on the basis that on one’s appraisal x is better than y, even though one
is not very conﬁdent about this value judgement. But if the choice is very important,
then one needs to be a lot surer of the value judgements underlying one’s decision to
take it, or certainly to take it responsibly. This intuition is intended to be normative –
it is intended to say something about how people should decide on the basis of value
judgements in which they may be more or less conﬁdent – although a full defence
would go beyond this paper. It may also describe the way that people actually do make
decisions in several cases, though it would require experimental work to determine to
what extent this is indeed the case.
To formalise this intuition, a ﬁrst requirement is a notion of importance of a choice.
We thus assume that there exists a set I of possible importance levels, and that this set
is equipped with a linear ordering (that is, an antisymmetric weak ordering) 4: i 4 j
means that the importance level j is “higher” than the level i.
The importance levels are related to two factors in a choice problem. First of all,
they are related to the degree of conﬁdence required in a value judgement for it to
play a role in the choice, via the maxim that the more important a decision, the more
conﬁdent one needs to be in a value judgement for it to play a role in the choice.
So to each level of importance can be associated the value judgements in which the
agent has enough conﬁdence to use for choices of this importance. Since, as discussed
above, a set of such value judgements can be represented by the appropriate set of weak
orderings, the relationship between importance level and conﬁdence can be naturally
5This can be formulated just in terms of the order itself as follows: 6 is tight if, for any R;R0 2 P, if
T
Ri6R0 Ri  R, then R 6 R0.
8Brian Hill Conﬁdence in preferences
represented by a function which associates to each importance level a set in the nested
family of sets 6. Moreover, when the importance rises, the appropriate amount of
conﬁdence rises, so the set of value judgements in which there is sufﬁcient conﬁdence
becomes smaller; in the representation, this corresponds to the fact that the set of weak
orderings corresponding to higher importance level contains the set corresponding to
lower importance level. Technically, this can be captured by a function D : I ! P
such that (i) for all i 2 I and all R;R0 2 P with R0 6 R, if R 2 D(i), then R0 2 D(i),
and (ii) D(i)  D(j) if i 4 j.
Such a function captures the agent’s attitude to choosing in the absence of conﬁ-
dence: for two agents with the same implausibility order but different D, the one with
smaller D(i) requires less conﬁdence in a value judgement to use it in a decision of
importance level i than the agent with higher D(i). This is a subjective factor, the
agent’s taste for choosing in important decisions on the basis of limited conﬁdence; or,
to put it in another way, his cautiousness when it comes to choosing on the basis of
value judgements in which he has limited conﬁdence. The function will be called the
cautiousness coefﬁcient.
Secondly, the importance levels are supposed to capture an aspect of the choice
situation or decision the agent is faced with. Some decisions are more important than
others; to the former are associated importance levels which are higher (according to
the order 4) than the importance levels associated to the latter. So, to each choice
situation will be associated not only a set of available alternatives (sometimes called
the menu) but also an importance level. The pair (S;i) represents the choice offered
among the elements in S, with importance i. We come back to this representation of
choice situations and the notion of importance level in Section 3.1.
This only leaves the deﬁnition of choice functions. Under the standard deﬁnition,
a choice function c is a function from the set of non-empty subsets of X (which we
denote by }(X) n ;) to the set of subsets of X (denoted }(X)) such that (i) for every
non-empty S  X, c(S)  S; and (ii) for every non-empty S  X, c(S) is non-
empty. According to the maxim proposed above, an agent should chose based on value
judgements which he is conﬁdent enough in given the importance of the decision; this
implies that there may be decisions of such importance that he does not have sufﬁcient
conﬁdence in the relevant value judgements to make a choice. We thus weaken the
second condition and allow the choice function to yield empty choice sets. We deﬁne
a choice function to be a function c : }(X)n; ! }(X) such that c(S)  S for every
non-empty S  X. c(S) is called the choice set, and if x 2 c(S) then x is said to be
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admissible. For a detailed consideration and defence of this notion of choice function,
see Section 3.2.
The object of study are variants of choice functions which account for importance.
An importance-indexed choice function is a function c : (}(X)n;)I ! }(X) such
that c(S;i)  S for every non-empty S  X and every i 2 I.
Having introduced this new sort of choice function, a corresponding notion of ra-
tionalisability is required. The idea is simple: for each choice situation, the importance
level picks out, via the cautiousness coefﬁcient D, a set of weak orderings which rep-
resent all the value judgements which the agent is conﬁdent enough in to use in his
choice. Then he chooses on the basis of this set of weak orderings in a speciﬁed way.
We thus propose a notion of rationalisability of a choice function by a set of weak
orderings, which is then extended to a notion of rationalisability of an importance-
indexed choice function by an implausibility order.
Deﬁnition 1.2. For any S 2 X and R  P, let sup(S;R) = fx 2 Sj xRy for all y 2
S and all R 2 Rg.
A choice function c is rationalisable by a set of weak orderings if there exists
R  P such that, for all non-empty S  X, c(S) = sup(S;R).
An importance-indexed choice function c is rationalisable by an implausibility or-
der if and only if there exists an implausibility order 6 and an cautiousness coefﬁcient
D such that, for all non-empty S  X and i 2 I, c(S;i) = sup(S;D(i)).
sup(S;R) contains those elements of S which are at least as good as all the other
elements of S according to all the weak orderings in R. Rationalisability by a set of
weak orderings R says that an element is in the choice set if and only if it is at least
as good as all other elements on the menu according to all the weak orderings in R.
Rationalisability by an implausibility order basically says that, for every importance
level i, an element is in the choice set if it is at least as good as all the other alternatives
according to all orderings in the set corresponding to that importance level, D(i).
The notion of rationalisability by a set of weak orderings proposed above has re-
ceivedlittleattentioninthechoice-theoreticliterature. Muchmorepopularisthenotion
according to which the choice set contains those elements which are best according to
at least one ordering, rather than according to all orderings; in other words, where the
choice set is the union of the sets of best elements according to each of the weak or-
derings, rather than the intersection (Moulin, 1985).6 The intersection notion proposed
6Translated in terms of quasi-orderings, the notion of rationalisibility proposed here picks out the set of
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above is of course stronger than the union notion, but it is traditionally seen as prob-
lematic, because, unlike the union notion, it does not always yield non-empty choice
sets. However, this property, though it may be unwanted if one is interested in ratio-
nalising choices by a single ordering or by a single set of orderings, is less problematic
for implausibility orders. All that the emptiness of the choice set indicates is that there
are degrees of conﬁdence such that the agent is not conﬁdent of any particular choice
to that degree. This does not imply that he cannot make a choice – he could always
chose, but relying on preference judgements which he endorses, but of which he is not
very conﬁdent. We shall return to this issue in detail in Section 3.2.
2 Representation
In this section we give necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for rationalisability by an
implausibility order. To this end, consider the following properties of importance-
indexed choice functions c.
For all x;y 2 X, S;T  X and i;i0 2 I,
 If x 2 S  T and x 2 c(T;i), then x 2 c(S;i)
 If x 2 S, y 2 S \ T, y 2 c(T;i) and x 2 c(S;i), then x 2 c(S [ T;i)
Consistency If x 2 c(S;i) and i < i0, then x 2 c(S;i0)
Centering For all S  X, there exists j 2 I such that c(S;j) is non-empty
We have the following result.
Theorem 1. An importance-indexed choice function is rationalisable by an implau-
sibility order if and only if it satisﬁes ,  and Consistency. Moreover, it is rational-
isable by a centred order if and only if it satisﬁes Centering. In both cases, there is a
unique coarsest tight rationalising implausibility order and cautiousness coefﬁcient.7
The proof is to be found in the Appendix. It relies heavily on a representation result
for choice functions, which involves the following two properties.
optimal elements, to use Sen’s (1997) terminology, whereas the union notion picks out the set of maximal
ones. Just as noted in the text, maximal elements of quasi-orderings always exist, whereas this is not the case
for optimal elements.
7Recall that an implausibility order 6 is coarser than 60 if, for any R;R0 2 P, R 60 R0 implies
that R 6 R0, but R <0 R0 does not necessarily imply that R < R0. For a deﬁnition of tightness, and a
discussion of its relevance here, see Section 1.1 and in particular footnote 2.
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 if x 2 S  T and x 2 c(T), then x 2 c(S)
 if x 2 S, y 2 S \ T, y 2 c(T) and x 2 c(S), then x 2 c(S [ T)
Theorem 2. A choice function c is rationalisable by a set of orderings if and only
if it satisﬁes  and . Moreover, in this case, there is a unique tight rationalising set
of orderings. Finally, if c always takes non-empty values, then the rationalising set of
orderings is a singleton.
Evidently, the properties  and  in the representation of importance-indexed
choice functions are just the importance-indexed versions of  and . They state that
 and  hold on sets of alternatives when the importance level is the same. As con-
cerns the properties  and  themselves, the former is Sen’s  (also called Chernoff’s
property) and requires no further discussion.
By contrast, to our knowledge, there has been little study of choice functions
(which, recall, may yield empty choice sets); accordingly, the property  and the The-
orem 2 are new. To illustrate,  says that if x is a best candidate for a position from
a European university and y is a best candidate from an American university, and if y
is also afﬁliated to a European university, then x is a best candidate from among Euro-
pean and American universities.  says that the same consequence holds, given that
the choices all have the same importance level.
It follows from the ﬁnal clause in Theorem 2 that, on choice functions,  is equiv-
alent to Sen’s . However, in the absence of the non-emptiness condition,  is strictly
stronger than . On the one hand,  implies : for x;y 2 c(S), S  T and y 2 c(T),
 applies to x, y, S = S \ T and T, yielding that x 2 c(S [ T) = c(T) as required.
On the other hand, here is an example where  is satisﬁed but  is not: X = fx;y;zg,
c(fx;yg) = fxg, c(fy;zg) = fyg, c(fx;zg) = fxg and c(fx;y;zg) = fg. It fol-
lows from the theorem above that  is too weak to guarantee rationalisation of choice
functions by sets of weak orderings;  is the appropriate property for choice functions.
Consistency is probably the property which differs most from traditional choice-
theoretic properties which can be found in the literature. For good reason: it concerns
the comparison between choices at different levels of importance. It says that any
option which is admissible when the importance is high will continue to be admissible
when the menu remains the same but the importance level drops. In other words, as the
importance decreases, more alternatives become admissible – and so may be chosen –
but no previously admissible alternatives cease to become admissible. Of course, as is
standard in choice theory, the fact that an alternative is admissible does not mean that it
will actually be chosen. So this property is compatible with (concrete) cases where the
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option actually chosen when the decision is important is not that which is chosen when
it becomes less important: it only demands that the alternative could (rationally) have
been chosen in the less important situation, or in other words that it is still admissible.
The ﬁnal property, Centering, states that one can always make a choice from any
menu, provided the importance level is low enough. In many cases, this might seem
reasonable: although one is not conﬁdent enough in one’s relevant value judgements to
pick out an option when the decision is important, one has no trouble selecting some
“best guesses” when little rests on the decision. This property is only required for the
implausibility order to be centered (Theorem 1); as noted in Section 1.1, we do not
wish to take any position here on whether the centredness of the implausibility order,
and correspondingly the Centering property on importance-indexed choice functions,
is normatively advisable or descriptively acceptable in general.
Note ﬁnally that this representation, and Theorem 1, is a strict generalisation of
the standard theory of choice and the axiomatisation by Sen’s properties  and . If
c(S;i) = c(S;j) for all importance levels i and j and all non-empty subsets S, then the
properties above equivalent to the conjunction of  and . The cautiousness coefﬁcient
sends all the importance levels to the same, singleton, set of weak orderings, so the
representation collapses into the traditional representation by a weak ordering. As the
cautiousness coefﬁcient indicates, this captures the case of an agent who is insensitive
to his conﬁdence in his preferences and to the importance of the decision.
3 Discussion
In this section, we discuss in more detail two of the least standard elements of the
proposal outlined above: the notion of importance level and the permissibility of empty
choice sets.
3.1 The importance level
A major element of the current proposal is the extension of the ordinary representation
of choice situation from a set of available alternatives (the menu) to a set of alternatives
and an importance level. The latter is exogenous, insofar as it is not derived from the
menu, but taken as given along with it.8 Of course, this extra structure may make some
8In choice theory, little structure is assumed on the alternatives. If more structure is assumed, it becomes
possible to deﬁne an equivalent of the importance level in terms of the set of alternatives on offer; see Hill
(2009) for an example of how this may be done in the case of decision under uncertainty.
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readers uncomfortable.
The supplementary assumptions on which this representation of choice situations
relies are as follows: (i) to each choice which the agent is faced with, one can associate
a set of elements from X and an importance level from I; and (ii) any pair consisting
of a subset of X and an importance level from I represents a choice which the agent
could conceivably be faced with.
Both of these assumptions are just versions of assumptions which are involved in
the traditional representation of choice situations as subsets of a set of alternatives X.
On the one hand, this representation supposes that the element x when it belongs to the
menu fx;yg is in a relevant sense “the same” as the element x in fx;y;zg. This cor-
responds to the ﬁrst assumption above, (i), which we call for this reason identiﬁcation.
On the other hand, the representation permits that all sets of elements of X represent
choice situations in which the agent might conceivably ﬁnd himself; this is the second
aspect, (ii), which we call richness.9 In practice, the choice of the set of alternatives X
is at the modeller’s discretion, and he has to ﬁnd a balance between these two “struc-
tural” assumptions, which, though necessary in some form or other for every theory of
choice, are often in tension. Consider, for instance, some of the examples Sen raises
against the most natural notion of identiﬁcation among alternatives (1993; 1997), such
as the example of the choice between tea and going home, and the extension by the
offer of cocaine.10 As Sen notes, one could reply to such examples by reﬁning the set
of alternatives to distinguish between the option of tea with cocaine not being on the
menu and the option of tea with cocaine also being on the menu. However, this de-
fence of identiﬁcation leaves richness in a sorry state, for it demands that one can ﬁnd
situations in which the agent has the choice between some rather strange alternatives,
such as between having tea with cocaine also being on the menu and going home with
cocaine not being on the menu.
In the light of this it is not necessarily unreasonable to impose extra structure on the
representation of the choice situation: as we shall see below, this sometimes allows an
improvement in identiﬁcation whilst limiting the damage done by richness. Of course,
to the extent that such extra structure may not be easily discernable in all decision
9Of course, only weaker versions of this are needed, but they all require at least that for any two elements
there exists menus containing them both and representing a conceivable choice situation, and this is all that
is needed for the points made below to be relevant.
10When offered the choice between having tea with an acquaintance and going home, the agent chooses
the tea, whereas when the choice is between tea with the acquaintance, cocaine with the acquaintance and
going home, he chooses home; these choices violate the property .
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situations, it may not be appropriate for all examples; however, this does not imply
that they are no cases where it is a relevant, and indeed useful, compromise between
identiﬁcation and richness. Here are some examples where a modelling of the sort
proposed above seems reasonable:
 a governing body is considering policies for encouraging recycling in the popu-
lation. It seems reasonable to say that in general the “same” policies are available
(for example, advertising, ﬁnes, bonuses, nudging etc.), but that the importance
of the decision differs according to whether the governing body is the head of a
household or an ofﬁce, local government, regional government, national govern-
ment or an international body.
 a young academic is to present his work to a public of peers. The occasion could
be an in-house closed seminar, an open seminar, an international conference,
an occasion where only people who know his work are present, an occasion
where potential employers could be in the audience and so on (the academic
proﬁle of the audience is the same in all cases). It seems that the “same” options
are available concerning how to present his material, but the importance differs
between the different cases.
 consider a classic moral dilemma where you have the choice between killing one
person, thus saving ten, or refusing to kill the one, thus sacriﬁcing the ten. There
is a sense in which this is the “same” choice as that between killing ten people
or letting a hundred die, and as that between killing hundred people and letting
a thousand die, and so on;11 but the gravity of the choices differs among these
cases.
In all of these cases, there is certainly a sense in which the same options are avail-
able, but the importance of the choices to be taken differs. They are thus cases to
which the representation of choice situations proposed above can be applied. To show
that the importance level is a factor which needs to be taken into account, it sufﬁces
to establish that the admissible choices may differ depending on the importance level.
This certainly seems to be true. Although the academic may try out a less standard
organisation of his presentation or incorporation of material he is less sure about on a
11If you prefer, replace this example with the choice between killing 0:0001% (respectively, 0:001%,
0:01% and so on) of the human population, and letting 0:001% (respectively, 0:01%, 0:1% and so on) die,
or even another scaling between the cases, if deemed necessary.
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“friendly” audience, when the importance of the event is higher he would more likely
revert to an organisation and a choice of material he is more conﬁdent in. And although
it may be acceptable to try new methods of encouraging recycling on a local level, on
a global level one needs to be much more conﬁdent to revert to them. Indeed, one
sometimes hears people say that, although a policy “worked” when tried out on a local
level, more reﬂection is needed before deciding whether to apply it nationally. Such
assertions seem to rely on the tacit assumption that the national decision is more impor-
tant than the local one, and so requires more deliberation. In fact, there are quite a few
cases where people cite the importance of a decision as a relevant factor in the choice
made. To take an example from moral theory, Rawls (1971, p169) explicitly raises the
question of the importance of the agreement made under the “veil of ignorance” as a
point in favour of his principles of justice; he thus admits that importance (of the choice
under the veil of ignorance as opposed to a choice taken outwith the veil, for example)
may be relevant for choices one takes.12
In many of these cases, one might have the impression that the choice is the same,
but that the context differs. To take the ﬁrst example, the same decision has to be
taken about recycling, but in a household, local, regional, national or global context.
This intuition can be captured by modelling the context by a function (call it ) which
associates to every menu an importance level: this is the importance attached to the
choice among these alternatives in this context. The choice situations will thus be
represented by pairs consisting of a menu (the alternatives on offer) and a context
function (the context of the choice). This representation of choice is visibly equivalent
to that proposed, and indeed, a notion of rationalisability for choice functions on pairs
consisting of a set of alternatives and a context can be proposed and axiomatised as
above (replacing appearances of i by (S)).
We take examples such as those given above to indicate that the representation of
choice situations proposed in Section 1.2 may be relevant in several cases. Neverthe-
less, it is worthwhile noting that the result obtained in Section 2 remains valid even if
the choice situation is represented in the traditional way, as a set of alternatives. Were
one to represent the choice situations in the examples above in the standard way, then,
as already noted, one would have to revert to “ﬁner” alternatives. A natural choice
would be to replace the set of alternatives X by the set X  I of pairs consisting of an
alternative and an importance level. (x;i) is the alternative of choosing x in a choice of
12Thanks to Thibault Gajdos for suggesting this example.
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importance i. The importance-indexed choice function generates a choice function
which is deﬁned on a subset of the menus generated by this set of alternatives: namely,
on those menus consisting of elements with the same importance level. In that sense,
Theorem 1 can alternatively be thought of as an axiomatisation of a rationalisation of
a partially-deﬁned choice function on more or less standard menus. The menus on
which the function is not deﬁned are those with mixed importance levels: examples
include the choice between choosing advertising to promote recycling on a national
level (for example, for the whole of France), and using “nudging” techniques on a lo-
cal level (for the city of Caen). As noted above, it is not always easy to make sense
of such choices; indeed, the fact that a (fully deﬁned) choice function on this set of
alternatives requires choices to be made on such menus is an example of the problems
which too ﬁne an identiﬁcation can pose in terms of the required richness.
Ofcourse, therepresentationproposedheredoesnotrequireanychoicestobemade
on such menus, and information gained from the choices on which it is deﬁned does
not imply any particular choices on these peculiar menus. Nevertheless, if desired,
it is possible to extend the notion of rationalisation proposed above to such menus:
to take as example one of several possibilities, one could choose those alternatives
which are best for all preference orderings singled out by the highest importance level
among the alternatives on the menu.13 Representation theorems for such notions of
rationalisability can be proved, by making appropriate modiﬁcations to Theorem 1
above. Depending on one’s view on these sorts of mixed-importance menus, one might
be more or less attracted by these theorems.
Before closing the discussion of importance levels, let us make a remark concern-
ing the assumption that the importance levels can be ordered by a linear order (4).
Basically, this boils down to assuming that the order of “higher importance” is transi-
tive and complete. Although the former assumption is very intuitive, and although the
latter is natural in many cases, there may be cases where the latter assumption, com-
pleteness, does not seem to be satisﬁed. To take the second example given above, it
may not be possible to determine whether the talk given as an invitee to a seminar in
one department (where, say, the person in question intends to apply for a position) is of
higher, lower or equal importance than the talk given as invitee in another department
(which the person in question also intends to apply to); that is, it might not be possible
to rank one importance level relative to the other. There is a natural generalisation of
Theorem 1 which can deal with such cases. All that is required is a relaxation of the
13Formally: (x;i) 2 c(S) if and only if x 2 sup(S;D(sup(y;j)2S j)).
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assumption that implausibility orders are complete: that is, that every pair of weak or-
derings on X can be ranked according to implausibility. If the order on the importance
levels 4 is transitive but not complete, then the properties ,  and Consistency are
necessary and sufﬁcient for a rationalisation of the sort given in Deﬁnition 1.2, where
the implausibility order is transitive, reﬂexive but not necessarily complete. The other
clauses of Theorem 1 continue to hold.
3.2 Choice functions
It has long been recognised that indifference and indeterminacy of preferences are dif-
ﬁcult to distinguish on the basis of choice; accordingly, the problem of “deducing”
preference from choice is particularly thorny in cases where preferences may be in-
determinate. Recently proposed solutions have involved weakening the Weak Axiom
of Revealed Preference (Eliaz and Ok, 2006), looking at sequential choice (Mandler,
2009) or invoking choices over opportunity sets and supposing preference for ﬂexibil-
ity (Danan, 2003). The method employed in this paper is different, and very simple: it
uses choice functions which may yield the empty set on some menus (which we have
called choice functions). But how are the cases where the choice function yields the
empty set to be interpreted?
The simplest answer is that the agent refuses to make a decision. In practice, this
may come out in many ways. For example, he might admit that he is not sure what to
do. More interestingly, there may be cases where he can defer the decision to whoever
would next have to take it (including, perhaps, himself at a later time); this is what he
would do when the choice set is empty. Deferral of decisions seems a natural option for
identifying cases of incompleteness or indeterminacy of preferences, or lack of conﬁ-
dence in value judgements. Certainly, there seem to be several non-trivial examples
where deferral, or something like it, is an option:
 a secretary takes the responsibility of making many decisions on behalf of her
boss without consulting him. However, there are decisions which she could be
called upon to make but which she would not accept to make in the absence
of her boss, or at the least without his conﬁrmation that her proposed decision
is suitable. This is a case where she does not actually make a choice from the
options available, but “defers” the decision to her boss.
 in the English law system, a judge may state in his verdict that he found the case
very difﬁcult and would grant that the case is ﬁt for appeal. (Under English law,
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a party who wishes to appeal has to ask the judge to declare the case ﬁt for appeal
at the end of the hearing.) In essence, the judge is emitting a judgement on the
case, as he must, but admitting that the case should conceivably be reconsidered
by others; this is the closest thing to a deferral under the obligation to express a
choice or judgement.
 a person is faced with a moral dilemma, and he is unsure about the correct option.
He decides to delay taking the decision, in order to consult friends, advisers,
mentors and so on on the moral issues involved; the ﬁnal decision will be taken
on a more rounded and thought-through set of preferences. In a sense, he is
deferring the decision to his future – hopefully more morally conﬁdent – self.
The most detailed study of questions relating to deferral in the economic literature
is doubtless in the “preference for ﬂexibility” tradition, following on from the ground-
breaking work of Kreps (1979) (see Danan (2003) for an application of related ideas to
incomplete preferences). Researchers in this tradition consider how the agent restricts
or keeps open the future choices which he will be faced with. However, in most of
these cases, the proposed model is strategic: ﬁrst of all, the agent can choose which op-
tions to leave open for himself and which ones to rule out; moreover, the agent makes
this choice on the basis of his beliefs about what he will prefer at the time when he
will ﬁnally make his choice. The examples above do not seem to be strategic in either
of senses: ﬁrst of all, the agent cannot and does not restrict the options open to the
person who will eventually decide (the secretary does not dictate what decisions are
“allowed” to her boss); secondly, the agent does not decide to defer on the basis of
his or her beliefs about his future preferences (if one defers the decision in the moral
dilemma, one does not consider what one might end up judging to be best). Moreover,
by contrast with the literature just cited, the choice of deferral does not imply that one
will get to make the choice in the future: in the ﬁrst two examples, the agents are de-
ferring to someone else (respectively, the secretary’s boss and the court of appeal). In
fact, it is arguable that in some of these cases, the agent’s own preferences play at most
a very slight role. The agent does not have any personal interest in the outcome of the
deferred choice; if he defers, it is not because he would like a particular choice to be
taken, but because he would like the “right” choice (whatever that be) to be taken. To
the knowledge of the author, such cases have received little attention in the economic
literature, though the question of deferral is relevant in many cases, and a theory of
when one should defer or not does seem to be required.
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It is an advantage of the proposal made in the preceding sections that it can be
thought of as providing a theory of when to defer. The empty choice set can be inter-
preted as indicating that the agent would like to defer, or that he would defer if possible.
As a theory of deferral, it is eminently reasonable: it says that one should defer if one’s
conﬁdence in the choice of any alternative does not match up to the importance of the
decision.
As just noted, deferral is not to be understood as leaving the choice to someone
whose decisions are predictable (or about which the agent has probabilities), but it is
left entirely unspeciﬁed as to what the ﬁnal decision may be. One might complain that,
if deferral is seen as an option, then it should be incorporated into the menu offered to
the agent. Indeed, this can be done, and yields a representation visibly similar to that
proposed in Section 1.2.
Let us use the symbol y to represent the option of deferral; when y is present in
the menu, the option of deferral is available, when it is absent, deferral is not avail-
able. The current proposal can be formulated entirely in terms of importance-indexed
choice functions (ie. functions always yielding non-empty choice sets) on the set of
alternatives X [ fyg (where X is as above).
Now deferral is an alternative which has a special status with respect to the others.
For one, the question of identiﬁcation (see Section 3.1) is particularly complicated:
whereas the alternatives are supposed to be deﬁned at such a level of ﬁneness that x
chosen from menu S can be treated as the same x as that chosen from T, it is unclear
whether there is any sense in which deferral when the choice is from menu S can
ever judiciously be thought of as the “same thing” as deferring from the choice on
menu T. In the face of this, one could introduce a set of different new alternatives
“deferring from S”, “deferring from T” and so on, with all the disadvantages in terms
of richness that were discussed above. Alternatively, one could admit just one new
alternative, y, but give it a distinguished role in the deﬁnition of rationalisability and in
the axiomatisation. Since deferral is an special option, the axioms on choice will have
to reﬂect some of its distinctive properties.
As regards rationalisability, the theory proposed above, under the interpretation of
an empty choice set as deferral, immediately implies a notion of rationalisability for
menus containing the deferral option y, namely: for all S  X [ fyg such that y 2 S
and all i 2 I, if sup(S;D(i)) is non-empty, then c(S;i) = sup(S;D(i)), and if not,
then c(S;i) = y. This renders explicit the idea that one does not defer if there are
options which are optimal according to all the weak orderings in the relevant set and
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that one does defer (and not possibly do something else) if not. It remains to deﬁne
the value of the choice function when deferral is not available. Of course, the notion
of rationalisability proposed in Deﬁnition 1.2 does not deal with this case, but we have
already mentionned an intuition about what one should do: choose an option that one
is most conﬁdent in choosing. This yields the following deﬁnition of rationalisability
of importance-indexed choice functions on sets of alternatives including an explicit
deferral option.
Deﬁnition 3.1. An importance-indexed choice function c on a set of alternatives in-
cluding an explicit deferral option, X [ fyg, is rationalisable by an implausibility
order if and only if there exists an implausibility order 6 and an cautiousness function
D such that, for all non-empty S  X [ fyg and i 2 I, and all x 2 X,
x 2 c(S;i) if x 2 sup(S;D(i))
or y = 2 S and x 2 sup(S;D(j)) for all j s.t. sup(S;D(j)) 6= ;
y 2 c(S;i) if y 2 S and sup(S;D(i)) = ;
The ﬁrst clause says that x is in the choice set if either it is admissible by the lights
ofthepreviousnotionofrationalisability(Deﬁnition1.2)ordeferralisnotavailableand
x is admissible by the lights of the previous notion of rationalisability for all levels of
importancewherethechoicesetyieldedbythatnotionisnon-empty. Thesecondclause
says that one chooses to defer if the option is available and no options are admissible
by the lights of the previous notion of rationalisability.
It should not be surprising that this notion of rationalisability can be axiomatised
along similar lines to the axiomatisation proposed in Section 2. In fact, let the proper-
ties y, y and Consistencyy be identical to the properties ,  and Consistency in
Section 2, except that they apply to all S;T  X [ fyg, and consider the following
new property and modiﬁcation of Centering:
Deferral If y 2 c(S;i), then c(S;i) \ X = ;
Centeringy For all S  X [ fyg, there exists j 2 I such that c(S;j) 6= fyg
Deferral just states that if one defers no alternative in X is admissible. Centeringy
statesthatforanymenuthereisanimportancelevelforwhichonedoesnotdefer. These
properties are necessary and sufﬁcient for the rationalisability of importance-indexed
choice functions where there is an explicit deferral option.
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Theorem 3. An importance-indexed choice function on a set of alternatives including
an explicit deferral option is rationalisable by a centered implausibility order if and
only if it satisﬁes y, y, Consistencyy, Centeringy and Deferral. Moreover, there is a
unique coarsest tight rationalising implausibility order and cautiousness coefﬁcient.
We conclude that the interpretation of empty choice sets as deferral is not only
natural in many cases, but is entirely consistent with the traditional choice-theoretic
methodology, via the addition of a special option for deferral into the menus.
4 Social choice and conﬁdence
With an eye to illustrating the interest of the notion of conﬁdence in preferences pro-
posed here, let us brieﬂy consider an application to social choice. This discussion is
not intended to be a complete coverage of the potential importance of the notion of
conﬁdence for social choice, but rather a preliminary exploration of some of the possi-
bilities.
The basic idea is that, if agents differ not only in their preferences but in their
conﬁdence in their preferences, then the latter factor and not solely the former can and
often should be taken into account in the determination of the society’s preferences.
This makes sense: an agent’s conﬁdence in a preference (for x over y, for example)
reﬂects how “sure” he is that he is “right” (by his own lights). Hence in aggregating the
agents’ preferences, it is not unreasonable to give those preferences of which an agent
is more conﬁdent more bearing than those of which he is less conﬁdent. There are of
course several ways in which this can be done; here we will consider only one.
As regards the setup, the set of alternatives, weak orderings and so on are as spec-
iﬁed in Section 1.1. The set of members of the society (or voters) will be numbered,
so the set of voters (which is not necessarily ﬁxed) will be some V  N. Voters give
not just their preferences but also their conﬁdence in their preferences, which, as ar-
gued above, can be represented by an implausibility order. So a proﬁle is a function
w : V ! I. The task is to determine a social preference ordering on the alterna-
tives on the basis of each possible proﬁle. Given that the agents’ preferences are not
necessarily fully determinate, we allow that the social preference ordering may be in-
determinate; as noted in Section 1.1, this can be captured by representing it either by a
quasi-ordering or by a set of weak orderings; here we use the latter option. The objects
of study are thus functions which associate to each proﬁle a subset of P. We shall call
such functions conﬁdence-adjusted social choice functions (CASC), and denote them
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using the generic term f.
Following on from the intuition stated above, a natural CASC would be one which
selects social preferences which, on aggregate, the members of the society are most
conﬁdent in. Under one way of spelling out this idea, the CASC would aim to “min-
imise” the total implausibility of the social preferences (by the lights of the members
of the society); this is like maximising the “total conﬁdence” of society in the social
value judgements. This is by no means the only way to go; we shall brieﬂy discuss
another option below.
Every weak ordering in P has a place in the implausibility order of each of the
members of the society; this place can be “counted” by associating to the weak or-
dering its “rank” on the implausibility order 6. Formally, the “rank” of a weak or-
dering R under an implausibility order 6, n6(R), is deﬁned as follows: n6(R) =
supR0<R(n6(R0)) + 1, where the maximum over an empty set is taken to be  1. So
the orderings at the bottom of the implausibility order (the “most plausible” ones) are
of rank 0, those one rung up are of rank 1 and so on. The rank of a weak ordering can
be thought of as a measure of the “distance” which the ordering is from plausibility,
according to the implausibility order in question. (Figure 2 in Section 1.1 makes this
metaphor more vivid.)
A simple CASC which translates the idea that the social preference should be that
which minimises its total implausibility is the “additive rank-based” CASC.
Deﬁnition 4.1. The additive rank-based CASC f is deﬁned as follows: for any proﬁle
w, for any R 2 P,






nw(v)(R0) for all R0 2 P
The additive rank-based conﬁdence-adjusted social choice function picks out the
set of weak orderings whose total “implausibility”, as summed over all the voters, is
minimal (not greater than the total implausibility of any other orderings). In this sense,
it could be thought of maximising the total conﬁdence in the social value judgements.
Of course, although only a function yielding a set of weak orderings on alternatives
has been deﬁned, this can be easily extended to a deﬁnition of a function yielding an
“social” implausibility order (that is, an order on the set of weak orderings).
Observe that the additive rank-based conﬁdence-adjusted social choice function is
none other than the Borda rule, applied to orderings over alternatives rather than to
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alternatives themselves. Thanks to this, we immediately have, borrowing a result from
Young (1974), the following axiomatisation of this rule.14
Following Young, we say that a CASC f is neutral if, for  a permutation of the
set of orderings P, and ^  the induced permutation of proﬁles, f(^ (w)) = (f(w)) for
all proﬁles w. It is consistent if, for any w, w0 proﬁles for disjoint voter sets V and V’,
then f(w) \ f(w0) 6= ; implies that f(w) \ f(w0) = f(w + w0) (where w + w0 is
the proﬁle on V [ V 0 which agrees with w on V and w0 on V 0). It is faithful if, for
w a proﬁle for one voter, f(w) contains only the center of the voter’s implausibility
measure. Finally, a CASC f has the cancellation property if, whenever w is a proﬁle
such that, for any R;R0 2 P, the number of voters with R < R0 equals the number of
voters with R0 < R, then f(w) = P. The following holds.
Theorem 4. A CASC f is neutral, consistent, faithful and has the cancellation property
if and only if it is the additive rank-based rule.
As indicated, the conditions involved here are versions of standard conditions in the
literature, and the reader is referred to the relevant papers (especially Young (1974))
for further discussion.
Thepurposeoftheseconsiderationsisonlytogiveaﬂavourofpossibleapplications
of the notion of conﬁdence to social choice. There are several directions which one
could develop; let us just mention two.
First of all, the additive rank-based social choice rule is by far the only one, and
others can be found and axiomatised in the similar way to that proposed, by exploiting
the relation to voting theory. In fact, both the “additive” and the “rank-based” parts
could be altered. For example, it is very probable that an axiomatisation for a “maxmin
rank-based” conﬁdence-adjusted social choice function – which yields the set of those
preference orders whose worst conﬁdence ranking across voters is highest – can be ob-
tained by using recent results on maxmin rules in voting theory (for example, Congar
and Merlin (2009)). Or, to take another example, one might be able to develop and
axiomatise an “additive importance-based” conﬁdence-adjusted social choice function
– where the total is taken not of the ranks of the weak orderings under the implau-
sibility, but of the least importance levels which are associated to sets containing the
weak orderings. Each suggestion appears to bring with it different issues, which may
or may not be new. For example, the discussion of the relationship between the CASC
14Note that, though his theorem is stated for linear orderings, Young notes in the conclusion that it applies
to weak orderings as well. Naturally, the case of weak orderings is the one which is relevant here.
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proposed above and a minmax version may well mimic several classic debates in social
theory, in particular the debate between utilitarianism and egalitarianism. By contrast,
the comparison of rank-based and importance-based rules may well turn on the ques-
tion of whether the agents’ tolerances of choice in the absence of conﬁdence (cautious-
ness coefﬁcients) should be taken into account in the social preferences (as would be
the case under the importance-based rule) or not.
Secondly, the sort of aggregation discussed above is “ordering-wise”: it works with
the order on the set of weak orderings P. A further direction to explore is “judgement-
wise” aggregation. As hinted in Section 1, an implausibility order represents whether
the agent is more, less or equally conﬁdent in one value judgement (say, that alternative
x is better than y by his lights) than in another (say, that alternative x0 is better than
y0). Under “judgement-wise” aggregation, one would not aggregate the rankings of
the weak orderings under the implausibility order, but, say, the rankings of the value
judgements on the order on value judgements generated by the implausibility order.
This sort of aggregation may be interesting because the axioms would be expressed
solely in terms of conﬁdence in value judgements, and not in terms of orders on sets of
weak orderings. (For example, a “judgement-wise” version of the cancellation property
would be: whenever w is a proﬁle such that, for all alternatives x, y, x0 and y0, the
number of voters who are more conﬁdent in the judgement that x is better than y than
in the value judgement that x0 is better than y0 is equal to the number of voters who are
moreconﬁdentinthelatterjudgementthanintheformerone, thesocialchoiceistheset
of all weak orderings.) Of course, there is a large literature on judgement aggregation
whichisrelevanthere(inparticularDietrichandList(2009)). Aparticularlyinteresting
question is the relation between judgement-wise and ordering-wise choice rules: is
it the case, for example, that the set of value judgements endorsed by the result of
an additive rank-based conﬁdence-adjusted choice rule are those in which the total
conﬁdence is highest, as calculated by looking at the rankings of the judgements? This
is, to our knowledge, an open question.
5 Conclusion
People sometimes do not have preferences which are as determinate as the standard
model would have us believe. Often, this is because people are not conﬁdent enough in
some of the preferences they can be said to have. Of course, this may have implications
for choice: people should not choose on the basis of preferences in which they are not
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sufﬁciently conﬁdent, if they can possibly avoid it.
This paper has made a start at bringing conﬁdence in preferences into the ﬁeld of
choice theory. First of all, a representation of an agent’s conﬁdence in his preferences
was developped, a notion of rationalisability of choice in terms of conﬁdence in pref-
erence was proposed, and an axiomatisation of this notion was offered. The notion
of rationalisability involves two main concepts which, to the knowledge of the author,
have received relatively little attention in choice theory. Firstly, there is the concept of
the importance of a choice, with the accompanying idea that the more important the
choice, the more conﬁdent one needs to be in a preference to use it in one’s choice.
Secondly, there is the question of whether the agent can refuse to take a decision, or
opt to defer, with the idea that this would be the appropriate course of action were
the choice too important for the conﬁdence he has in the relevant preferences. These
notions, and their applications here, were discussed in detail.
Finally, in an attempt to indicate the relevance of the notion of conﬁdence, a pos-
sible application to social choice was considered. A simple conﬁdence-adjusted social
choice function was proposed, based on the idea that the social preferences should be
those in which the members of the society are, on aggregate, most conﬁdent. A sim-
ple axiomatisation was proposed for this rule, and directions for future research were
mentionned.
Conﬁdence in preferences has been given short shrift in choice theory to date. The
author is conﬁdent that this should change.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 2. Deﬁne the set of orderings R as follows: Ri 2 R iff, for all
x;y 2 X, if x 2 c(fx;yg), then xRiy. First note that this set is well-deﬁned. In
particular  implies the necessary transitivity: if x 2 c(fx;yg) and y 2 c(fy;zg),
then by , x 2 c(fx;zg). Note also that this set is tight: if R0 agrees with theR in R
wherever they all agree, then R0 2 R.
It needs to be shown that this set of orderings generates c; consider x 2 S  X.
Suppose x 2 c(S). Then, by , x 2 c(fx;yg) for all y 2 S. So, xRiy for all y 2 S
and Ri 2 R, as required.
Suppose now that xRiy for all y 2 S and Ri 2 R. Take an arbitrary enumera-
tion of the elements of S n fxg. We argue by induction that x 2 c(fx;y1;:::;yng)
for all n. By hypothesis and deﬁnition of R, x 2 c(x;y1). Suppose that x 2
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c(fx;y1;:::;yn 1g); by hypothesis and deﬁnition of R, x 2 c(x;yn); so by , with
x = y, S = fx;y1;:::;yn 1g and T = fx;yng, x 2 c(fx;y1;:::;yng). Hence
x 2 c(S), as required.
Since, if c never takes as value the empty set, for all x;y 2 X, either x or y (or
both) belong to c(fx;yg). There is thus only one relation R such that for all x;y 2 X,
xRy iff x 2 c(fx;yg): so the R constructed above is a singleton.
Proof of Theorem 1. The “only if” direction is straightforward to check. We consider
here the “if” direction.
For any i 2 I, note that c(;i) is a function from sets of alternatives to sets of
alternatives; it is a choice function because the image may be empty. We will note
this function ci in what follows.
 and  imply that, for every i 2 I, ci satisﬁes  and . Theorem 2 implies
that for each i 2 I, ci is rationalisable by a unique tight set of weak orderings Ri.
Moreover, by Consistency and Lemma 1 (below), if i 4 i0, then Ri0  Ri. Deﬁne 6
as follows: R 6 R0 iff for all i such that R0 2 Ri, R 2 Ri. It is straightforward to
check that this is complete, transitive and reﬂexive; ie. that it is an implausibility order.
Deﬁne D by: D(i) = Ri.
The representation of c by 6 and D follows immediately from the construction.
Also, by construction, 6 is tight, and any coarser tight relation would fail to rationalise
c; the uniqueness of D follows by construction. Consider ﬁnally the clause regarding
centering. Centering implies that for every S  X, there exists i 2 I such that ci(S)
is non-empty; by Consistency, there exists i 2 I such that, for all S  X, ci(S) is
non-empty. By the ﬁnal clause in Theorem 2, ci is a singleton. This is the center of 6.
Lemma 1. Let choice functions c1 and c2 be rationalised by tight sets of orderings
R1 and R2 respectively. If x 2 c1(S) implies that x 2 c2(S) for every x 2 S and
every S  X, then R1  R2.
Proof. By construction of the rationalising sets of orderings in Theorem 2. The con-
struction implies that R 2 Ri if and only if for all x;y 2 X, if x 2 ci(fx;yg) then
xRy (for i = f1;2g). However, for all R 2 R2 and all x;y 2 X, if x 2 c1(fx;yg)
then, by hypothesis, x 2 c2(fx;yg), and so xRy; from which it follows that R 2 R1,
as required.
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Proof of Theorem 3. Deﬁne the implausibility order as in the proof of Theorem 1, us-
ing the part of c deﬁned on menus containing y. It follows from the reasoning in the
proof of that theorem that, for all x 2 X and all S  X, x 2 c(S [ fyg;i) iff
x 2 sup(S;D(i)). By Deferral, if sup(S;D(i)) is non-empty then c(S [ fyg;i) =
sup(S;D(i)); by the fact that the choice function always yields non-empty sets, it fol-
lows that if sup(S;D(i)) is empty then c(S[fyg;i) = fyg. Moreover, if sup(S;D(i))
is non-empty, then by y, c(S;i) = c(S [ fyg;i) = sup(S;D(i)). Finally, it can be
seen that if sup(S;D(i)) is empty, then x 2 c(S;i) if and only if x 2 sup(S;D(j))
for all j such that sup(S;D(j)) is non-empty. For if not, then there is a j 2 I such
that sup(S;D(j)) is non-empty but does not contain x 2 c(S;i). So x = 2 c(S;j) but
y 2 c(S;j) for some y. Since sup(S;D(j)) is non-empty and sup(S;D(i)) is empty,
c(S [ fyg;j) is not contained in c(S [ fyg;i), so, by Consistency, it is not the case
that i 4 j. But, given j 4 i, Consistency implies that x 2 c(S;j) contrary to the
assumption.
Uniqueness follows from construction, as in the proof of Theorem 1.
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